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DUE PROCESS
deprived by a state government without the advantage of due
process of law, that is, the defendant is entitled to discover
evidence favorable to his defense with respect t9 either guilt or
punishment.4 9 The difference between federal and state law is a
matter of interpretation: federal common law dictates
undisclosed evidence will be considered material only if a
"reasonable probability" exists that it would have an impact on
the trial's outcome. 50 New York law, in contrast, abides by a
higher standard that requires reversal for any instance in which
the defendant has made a specific request for evidence and the




(decided June 5, 1996)
Defendant, George Scott, was convicted of first degree
manslaughter and criminal possession of a weapon in the second
and third degree.53 Defendant moved to vacate his conviction
pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law section 440.10,54 claiming
that the People's failure to disclose specifically requested,
favorable evidence which was material to the verdict [hereinafter
Brady55 evidence] violated the Due Process Clauses of the
49. Id. at 124, 666 N.E.2d at 223, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 518.
50. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
51. Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d at 77, 555 N.E.2dat 920, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 518.
52. 88 N.Y.2d 888, 667 N.E.2d 923, 644 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1996).
53. Id. at 889, 667 N.E.2d at 924, 644 N.Y.S.2d at 914.
54. N.Y. CRmi. PROC. LAW § 440.10(l)h) (McKinney 1992). Section
440.10 states in pertinent part:
1. At any time after the entry of a judgment, the court in which it was
entered may, upon motion of the defendant, vacate such judgment upon
the ground that: h) The judgment was obtained in violation of a right of
the defendant under the constitution of this state or of the United States.
Id.
55. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Brady (petitioner) and
Boblit, his companion were found guilty of first degree murder in separate
trials. Id. at 84. At his trial, Brady admitted to participating in the crime, but
he claimed that Boblit did the killing. Id. Before his trial, Brady requested that
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Federal56 and New York State57 Constitutions. 58 The trial court
granted the motion, but the Appellate Division, Second
Department reversed and reinstated the conviction.5 9 The New
York State Court of Appeals affirmed the appellate division on
different grounds. 60  The court of appeals held that the
"reasonable possibility standard of prejudice" applied because of
the specific discovery request, 6 1 but that there was no reasonable
possibility on the facts that the outcome of the trial would have
been different with disclosure of the evidence.
62
At the defendant's trial, the only eyewitness, Glenn Shaw,
testified that he heard what sounded like a gunshot and then saw
the defendant holding a handgun. 63 Shaw also testified that he
saw a woman identified as Jaqueline Lewis, an unidentified man,
and a fourth person running away from the victim's house.64
Shaw testified that he could not tell whether the fourth person
the prosecution produce Boblit's extra-judicial statements for Brady to
examine. Id. The prosecution provided some statements, but not the statement
in which Boblit admitted to the actual murder. Id. The Court held that "the
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon
request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Id.
at 87.
56. U.S. CONST. amend V. The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "[Nior shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . . ." Id. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The
Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part: "[N]or shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law
Id.
57. N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6. This section provides in pertinent part: "No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law." Id.
58. See Scott, 88 N.Y.2d at 890, 667 N.E.2d at 924, 644 N.Y.S.2d at
914.
59. Id. at 890, 667 N.E.2d at 924-25, 644 N.Y.S.2d at 914-15.
60. Id. at 891, 667 N.E.2d at 925, 644 N.Y.S.2d at 915.
61. Id. (quoting People v. Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d 67, 77, 555 N.E.2d 915,
920, 556 N.Y.S.2d 518, 523 (1990)).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 889-90, 667 N.E.2d at 924, 644 N.Y.S.2d at 914.
760 [Vol 13
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was a man or a woman. 65 Shaw submitted to a polygraph
examination by Detective Ponzi.66  A "scratch" sheet dated
November 18, 1985 and entitled "HOMICIDE BUREAU
INFORMATION SHEET" contained information pertaining to
Shaw's polygraph examination. 67  The defendant made a
discovery request for "a copy of the report of the polygraph
exam(s) given to the confidential informant showing date(s) of
exam and all results."'6 8  Defendant's motion to vacate his
conviction claimed that the People failed to produce Brad,
evidence in the form of the "scratch" sheet dated November 18,
1985, which alluded to a polygraph examination of Shaw and
information that the defendant may have found useful. 69 At the
hearing on the motion, the Assistant District Attorney who
prepared the document testified that she had no recollection of the
source of the information. 70 The trial prosecutor testified that
Detective Ponzi told her that Shaw had been one hundred percent
truthful. 71 Detective Ponzi submitted an affidavit stating that the
examination showed that Shaw was truthful and that, contrary to
the information in the "scratch" sheet, he never determined that
Shaw was withholding information.
72
65. Id. at 890, 667 N.E.2d at 924, 644 N.Y.S.2d at 914.
66. Id.
67. Id. (quoting the form and the title of the document, according to the
evidence). The "scratch" sheet contained the following information:
Facts: The deceased was found by his father lying in the foyer of his
apartment with a gunshot wound to the eye.
Action taken: The witness, Glenn Shaw submitted to a polygraph test
conducted on 11/4/85 at 3:00 P.M. by Mr. Joe Ponzi, Senior
Investigator for the purposes of verifying the statement given to A.D.A.
S. Miller on 9/23/85. Mr. Ponzi determined that the witness was
withholding pertinent information. When confronted with this
conclusion, the witness stated that he knew the identity of the second
male but was unwilling to disclose the name.
Id.
68. Id. (quoting defense counsel's language in the discovery request).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 891, 667 N.E.2d at 925, 644 N.Y.S.2d at 915.
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The New York State Court of Appeals agreed with the lower
courts that the information at issue was Brady evidence. 73 The
trial court granted a new trial, applying the "reasonable
possibility" standard in its determination that the sheet was
material because if produced, there was a reasonable possibility
that the evidence would have affected the outcome of the trial.
74
The appellate division reversed the trial court based on its
determination that there was not a specific request for the sheet,
thus, the more stringent "reasonable probability" standard
applied. 75 Under the latter standard, the court concluded that
there was not a "reasonable probability" that the outcome of the
trial would have differed if the defendant had the sheet.76
Although the New York State Court of Appeals affirmed the
denial of the motion to vacate the conviction, its holding was
based on the less stringent "reasonable possibility" standard for
demonstrating the materiality of the evidence.
77
The court of appeals stated in its analysis that "[a] defendant
has the right, guaranteed by the due process clauses of the
Federal and State Constitutions, to discover favorable evidence in
the People's possession which is material to guilt or
punishment. '"78 Federal case law has established that the
"reasonable probability" standard applies, regardless of the form
of the request, in determining whether favorable evidence is
material and that if it is material, its nondisclosure violated the
defendant's right to due process. 79 New York constitutional case
73. id.
74. Id. at 890, 667 N.E.2d at 924-25, 644 N.Y.S.2d at 914-15.
75. Id. at 890, 667 N.E.2d at 925, 644 N.Y.S.2d at 915.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 890-91, 667 N.E.2d at 925, 644 N.Y.S.2d at 915. In
determining what constitutes a possibility or a probability in any case, although
not explicitly stated, the courts have followed the totality of the circumstances
analysis.
78. Id. at 890, 667 N.E.2d at 925, 644 N.Y.S.2d at 915 (citing Brady,
373 U.S. at 87; Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d at 73, 555 N.E.2d at 917, 556 N.Y.S.2d
at 520. See infra pp. 9-11 (discussing Vilardi).
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law, however, has established that different standards apply
depending on the form of the defendant's request.80
The New York State Court of Appeals in Scott agreed that the
"scratch" sheet pertaining to the witness's polygraph examination
was Brady evidence and thus its nondisclosure invoked a due
process analysis. 81 In its reasoning, the court relied on People v.
Vilardi82 where the issue was whether New York should adopt
the United States Supreme Court's decision to apply the
"reasonable probability" standard to all cases in which this
constitutional issue arises. 83 In deciding the issue, Vilardi
provided an extensive comparison of the federal and state
constitutional law, beginning with Brady.
In Brady v. Maryland84 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
prosecution's nondisclosure of favorable evidence violates the
defendant's due process rights if the evidence is material to guilt
or punishment. 85 Therefore, if the prosecution failed to disclose
Brady evidence, the defendant would be entitled to a new trial. 86
The Court noted that it is "constitutional error if the evidence
would 'tend to exculpate' the defendant. "87 The purpose of the
Brady rule is to "ensure that a miscarriage of justice does not
occur. "88
After the Brady decision, courts faced issues that included
defining what constituted "material" evidence and whether the
standard for determining materiality changed depending on the
80. Scott, 88 N.Y.2d 888, 667 N.E.2d 923, 644 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1996);
Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d 67, 555 N.E.2d 915, 556 N.Y.S.2d 518 (1990).
81. See Scott, 88 N.Y.2d at 891, 667 N.E.2d at 925, 644 N.Y.S.2d at
915.
82. 76 N.Y.2d 67, 555 N.E.2d 915, 556 N.Y.S.2d 518 (1990).
83. Id. at 69, 555 N.E.2d at 915, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 518.
84. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
85. Id. at 87.
86. Id.
87. Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d at 73, 555 N.E.2d at 917, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 520
(quoting Brady, 373 U.S. at 88). The Court in Brady reasoned that "[a]
prosecution that withholds evidence on demand of an accused which, if made
available, would tend to exculpate him . . . helps shape a trial that bears
heavily on the defendant." Id. at 87-88.
88. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675. See infra pp. 8-9.
1997] 763
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form89 of the defendant's request. 90 Responding to these issues,
the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Agurs91 imposed a
two-tiered framework for determining the materiality of favorable
evidence. 92 The Court held that "evidence specifically requested
• . . was material if it 'might have affected the outcome of the
trial." 93 Moreover, the Court held that if there was no request or
a general request for exculpatory information, "the prosecution's
duty to disclose arose entirely from the notice provided by the
very nature of the evidence, and the standard for [the defendant
to obtain] a new trial would be higher . . . . ",94 In the latter
situation, the evidence would be material if it "create[d] a
reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist." 95  The Court
reasoned that two different standards were appropriate because in
one situation the defendant puts the prosecution on notice. 96 The
Court further reasoned that because of notice, the prosecution has
a responsibility to avoid any trial deception, and it's
nondisclosure of evidence is "seldom, if ever excusable. ,97
In United States v. Bagley, 98 the U.S. Supreme Court
reconsidered its approach in Agurs and determined that a single
standard would apply in all cases. 99  The Court held that
89. Id. at 682 (noting that the three forms include a specific request, a
general request, or no request at all).
90. Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d at 73, 555 N.E.2d at 917-18, 556 N.Y.S.2d at
520-21.
91. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
92. Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d at 73, 555 N.E.2d at 917, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 520
(citing Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976)).
93. Id. at 73, 555 N.E.2d at 918, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 521 (quoting Agurs,
427 U.S. at 104).
94. Id. (citing Agurs, 427 U.S. at 106-109).
95. Id. (quoting Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112).
96. Id. at 73-74, 555 N.E.2d at 918, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 521 (citing Agurs,
427 U.S. at 106-109).
97. Id. at 74, 555 N.E.2d at 918, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 521 (quoting Agurs,
427 U.S. at 106). See People v. Brown, 67 N.Y.2d 555, 496 N.E.2d 663, 505
N.Y.S.2d 574 (1986); People v. Cwikla, 46 N.Y.2d 434, 386 N.E.2d 1070,
414 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1979).
98. 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
99. Id. at 682. Although the Supreme Court in Bagley adopted a single
standard, the Court was "deeply divided" on the issue, which has caused some
[Vol 13
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"undisclosed evidence is material only if there is a 'reasonable
probability' that it 'would' have altered the outcome of the
trial." 10 0 The Court defined a "reasonable probability" as a
"probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome." 10 1  The Court determined that the higher standard
would apply in a specific request situation as well as a general or
no request situation.10 2 The Court in Bagley realized that a
prosecutor's failure to respond to a Brady request might impede
the adversarial process, but reasoned that this concern does not
require different materiality standards because the reviewing
court could assess any adverse consequences of the nondisclosure
under the totality of the circumstances analysis. 103 The court of
appeals explicitly rejected the Supreme Court's holding in
Bagley. 104 In People v. Vilardi, 105 the court of appeals held that
confusion in the lower court response. Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d at 74 n.4, 555
N.E.2d at 918 n.4, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 521 n.4.
100. Miardi, 76 N.Y.2d at 74, 555 N.E.2d at 918, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 521
(citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682).
101. Id. (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682). "In Bagley, the Court adopted
the same test it used in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) for
determining ineffective assistance of counsel claims ... ." Id. See infra note
52.
102. Id. (citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682).
103. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682-83 (applying the standard from Strickland to
this issue).
104. Viardi, 76 N.Y.2d at 77, 555 N.E.2d at 920, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 523.
Notably, the New York Court of Appeals "has not adopted the Striddand test
for determining ineffective assistance of counsel." Id. at 74, n.3, 555 N.E.2d
at 918, n.3, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 521, n.3.
105. 76 N.Y.2d 67, 555 N.E.2d 915, 556 N.Y.S.2d 518 (1990). Defendant
Vilardi was convicted of first degree arson, attempted arson, and conspiracy to
plant and set off a pipe bomb at two locations. Id. at 69-70, 555 N.E.2d at
915, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 518. An officer from the Bomb Squad inspected one
location where a bomb was supposed to have exploded and wrote an initial
report concluding that there was no evidence of an explosion. Id. at 70, 555
N.E.2d at 915-16, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 518-19. The defendant requested all
reports by "'ballistics, firearm, and explosive experts,'" but the prosecution
did not send the initial report. Id. at 70, 555 N.E.2d at 916, 556 N.Y.S.2d at
519. The court ordered a new trial and held that there was a reasonable
possibility that the defendant would not have been convicted if the prosecution
1997] 765
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if the defendant made a specific discovery request for favorable
evidence, the reviewing court must determine whether there was
a "reasonable possibility" that the failure to disclose the evidence
contributed to the verdict. 10 6 Additionally, the court reiterated
that it has, in other cases, "chosen not to adopt the 'reasonable
probability' standard as a matter of State law." 107 The court of
appeals reasoned that New York's "view of due process in this
area is . . . predicated both upon 'elemental fairness' to the
defendant, and upon concern that the prosecutor's office
discharge its ethical and professional obligations." 108 Moreover,
the court stated that the standard followed if New York is
premised on Agurs and has been the controlling standard
throughout the state's courts. 109 The court further reasoned that
had disclosed the favorable report. Id. at 78, 555 N.E.2d at 921, 556
N.Y.S.2d at 524.
106. Id. at 77, 555 N.E.2d at 920, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 523. But see Id. at 78,
555 N.E.2d at 921, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 524 (Simons, J., concurring)(disagreeing
with "the majority's standard for determining materiality based on the nature
of the defendant's request . . . [and] agree[ing] with the Supreme Court that
exculpatory evidence is either material to guilt or not material; it does not
become more so because of the form of the defendant's request for it").
107. Id. at 77, 555 N.E.2d at 920, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 523.
108. Id. at 76, 555 N.E.2d at 919, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 522 (citing People v.
Novoa, 70 N.Y.2d 490, 517 N.E.2d 219, 522 N.Y.S.2d 504 (1987); People
v. Cwikla, 46 N.Y.2d 434, 386 N.E.2d 1070, 414 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1979);
People v. Simmons, 36 N.Y.2d 126, 325 N.E.2d 139, 365 N.Y.S.2d 812
(1975); People v. Savvides, 1 N.Y. 2d 554, 136 N.E.2d 853, 154 N.Y.S.2d
885 (1956); People v. Creasy, 236 N.Y. 205, 140 N.E. 563 (1923)).
109. Id. (citing People v. Smith, 63 N.Y.2d 41, 468 N.E.2d 879, 479
N.Y.S.2d 706 (1984); People v. Porter, 128 A.D.2d 248, 516 N.Y.S.2d 201
(1987) (holding that reversal of conviction for defendant charged with
possession of cocaine was not necessary without a finding of materiality where
the district attorney's failure to disclose an exculpatory police report was not
failure to disclose evidence pursuant to a specific relevant request); People v.
Velez, 118 A.D.2d 116, 504 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1986) (holding that the
prosecution's failure to disclose to defendant that the prosecution's main
witness may have strong animosity against defendant cannot be considered a
collateral matter); People v. Kitt, 86 A.D.2d 465, 450 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1982)
(holding that the district attorney's failure to disclose laboratory test results
where defendant had made requests for all laboratory test results entitled
defendant to a new trial); People v. Ramos, 146 Misc. 2d 168, 550 N.Y.S.2d
[Vol 13766
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"a backward-looking, outcome-oriented standard of review (the
Bagley standard of "reasonable probability") that gives
dispositive weight to the strength of the People's case clearly
provides diminished incentive for the prosecutor" to review files
for and ultimately disclose exculpatory material.1 10 In addition,
the court concluded that the "reasonable possibility" standard is
an unambiguous rule that encourages prosecutorial compliance
with its disclosure obligations. 111
The New York State Court of Appeals in Scott relied on the
holding from Vilardi, with little policy analysis. The court in
Scott held that the "reasonable possibility" standard applied
because the defendant made a specific discovery request.
1 12
Moreover, consistent with kilardi, the court reasoned that
"[w]here the defense has provided specific notice of its interest in
particular material, heightened prosecutorial attention is
appropriate., 113 The court found the defendant's request to be
specific because it "provided particularized notice of the
information sought."' 114 The court noted that the defendant
doesn't need to know or request the exact form of the
document. 115
Applying the "reasonable possibility" standard to the facts in
Scott, the court determined that the defendant's motion to vacate
should not have been granted. 1 16 The court stated the rule that
"a polygrapher's opinions regarding the witness's veracity are not
784 (1990) (projecting that the New York Court of Appeals will retain Agurs
and reject Bagley).
110. Id. at 77, 555 N.E.2d at 920, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 523.
111. Id. But see Id. at 78-80, 555 N.E.2d at 921-22, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 524-
25 (Simons, J. concurring) (deciding that the Federal standard of "reasonable
probability" is appropriate for determining the materiality of Brady evidence
primarily because the language of the New York State Due Process Clause
does not differ materially from that of the Federal Due Process Clause and
thus, requires state analysis consistent with the federal analysis).
112. People v. Scott, 88 N.Y.2d 888, 891, 667 N.E.2d 923, 925, 644
N.Y.S.2d 913, 915 (1996).
113. Id. at 890, 667 N.E.2d at 925, 644 N.Y.S.2d at 915.
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admissible evidence." 117 Additionally, the court considered that
all the testimony at the hearing was contrary to the information
on the requested sheet. 118 The court concluded that "under these
circumstances, there is no reasonable possibility that the outcome
of the trial would have differed had the document been
produced. "119
In conclusion, New York law differs from federal law with
regards to the applicable standard for determining if a defendant's
due process rights were violated when he was denied favorable
evidence in the prosecution's possession. Under the Federal and
State Constitutions, a due process violation occurred if the
prosecution failed to disclose favorable evidence which is
material to the defendant's guilt. 120 Federal law has established
that evidence is material if there is a "reasonable probability" that
with disclosure, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. 12 1 This single standard must be employed irrespective
of the form of the discovery request, or lack thereof. 122 New
York law, however, has established that when a specific request
is made, evidence is material if there is a "reasonable possibility"
that with disclosure, the outcome of the proceeding would have
been different. 12 3 Furthermore, New York law distinguishes
between the forms of request in determining the applicable
standard.124 Under federal and state law, courts analyze the
totality of the circumstances to reach the final decision under the
applicable standard. 125




120. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
121. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
122. Id.
123. Scott, 88 N.Y.2d at 891, 667 N.E.2d at 925, 644 N.Y.S.2d at 915;
Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d at 77, 555 N.E.2d at 920, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 523.
124. Scott, 88 N.Y.2d at 891, 667 N.E.2d at 925, 644 N.Y.S.2d at 915;
Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d at 77, 555 N.E.2d at 920, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 523.
125. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 683; See Scott, 88 N.Y.2d at 891, 667 N.E.2d at
925, 644 N.Y.S.2d at 915.
768 [Vol 13
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In Scott, the New York State Court of Appeals affirmed its
decision in Vilardi to depart from the United States Supreme
Court's decision to apply a single standard in all cases. New
York law, thus, continues to afford defendants greater protection
than Federal law by using the less stringent standard for




(decided June 28, 1996)
The plaintiff, Michael Pringle, was arrested and charged with
driving while intoxicated. 127 The plaintiff brought this action
for a declaratory judgment to determine the constitutionality of
the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law section 1193 (2)(e)(7),
128
commonly referred to as the "prompt suspension law."
12 9
Pringle asserted this statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution 130 and article I, section 6 of the
New York State131 Constitution. 132 The challenged statute
required "that a driver who is charged with driving while
126. 88 N.Y.2d 426, 668 N.E.2d 1376, 646 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1996).
127. Id. at 430, 668 N.E.2d at 1378-79, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 85.
128. N.Y. VEH. & TRAP. LAw § 1193(2)(e)(7) (McKinney 1996). Section
1193(2)(e)(7) provides in pertinent part: Suspension pending prosecution;
excessive blood alcohol content. (a) A court shall suspend a driver's license,
pending prosecution, of any person ... alleged to have had . 10 of one percent
or more by weight of alcohol in such driver's blood ....
Id.
129. Pringle, 88 N.Y.2d at 429-30, 668 N.E.2d at 1378-79, 646 N.Y.S.2d
at 85.
130. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in
pertinent part: "No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." Id.
131. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. This section provides in pertinent part: "No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law." Id.
132. Pringle, 88 N.Y.2d at 430, 668 N.E.2d at 1378-79, 646 N.Y.S.2d at
19971 769
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